Due to the di¢culties of devising a system of …rst-best lump-sum taxes, optimal taxation models usually con…ne themselves to the study of the optimal shape of the linear/nonlinear income tax schedule and the structure of (linear) commodity taxation, disregarding any possibility to raise revenue by means of some limited, second-best lump-sum measures based on characteristics which are both easily observable and hard to alter by the individual. This approach has been criticized by Hahn (1972) who argues that there is a scope for some kind of lumpsum taxation with redistributive power and that this possibility has been de-emphasized by economists rashly. As Akerlof (1978) pointed out in his analysis of "tagging", if the tax system can be di¤erenti-ated between individuals, the redistribution-incentive con ‡ict can be substantially reduced.
Introduction
Many countries have ambitious redistributional goals implying high levels of income taxation, high marginal tax rates and ine¢ciencies. There is a continuous ongoing search for less distortive forms of taxation. Of course, we know that lump sum taxation yields no e¢ciency losses, on the other hand, usually it is a quite blunt instrument for redistribution. However, as Akerlof (1978) pointed out, if the tax system can be di¤erentiated between individuals according to some characteristic correlated with ability, there is a potential for reducing the con ‡ict between redistribution and e¢ciency. In most countries average income changes systematically with age. In this paper we will investigate if we can achieve redistribution at smaller e¢ciency costs by relating the tax payments to the age of persons.
The design of the tax system will depend on the objective of the social planner. There is a strong case for age dependent taxes if the social planner is concerned with annual utilities. If skill level and age covary perfectly, an age tax could in this case achieve the …rst best. However, if the social planner is concerned with life-time utilities, then, if age and skill covary perfectly, it implies that individuals have identical income paths and that no redistribution is needed. If there is no covariation, there will be no gains either. In the intermediate case, with some covariation, there might be a role for an age related tax. In this paper we will be concerned with this latter case.
We will use an extension of the Stiglitz-Stern (1982 ) simpli…ed version of the Mirrlees (1971) optimal income taxation model. We construct an OLG model with individuals living in two periods, facing a consumptionleisure choice in each period. All individuals are low skill in the …rst period of life. In the second period the proportion ¼ ll stays low skill and the proportion ¼ lh becomes high skill. This means that in the old age group the proportion of high skilled agents is higher than in the young age group.
If everyone is lh (low skill in …rst period, high skill in second period), all individuals are identical and we do not want to redistribute across individuals. There can still be motives for taxation. If there are market imperfections we might want to redistribute from old to young. If there are both lh and ll (low skill in both periods) individuals this means that individuals have di¤erent income paths and we would like to redistribute from the lh to the ll individuals. Ideally in this situation we would like to tax some index of lifetime income. However, real-life tax systems exclusively use annual income as tax base, we therefore impose the restriction in our analysis that annual income is the tax base. Hence, in our analysis the social planner is concerned with life-time utilities but can only use taxes imposed on annual income.
We will consider the design of the tax system under various observational assumptions. The …rst tax system that we consider is such that the social planner only knows the proportions of high and low skill, but not the joint age-skill distribution. Two income points are designed; one intended for the low skill and another intended for the high skill. The second tax system is designed under the assumption that the social planner knows the joint distribution of skill and age. It knows the mechanism that some low skill persons become high skill in the second period. However, it is assumed that the planner cannot observe the age of individuals. The planner will in principle attempt to design three income points; one for young low skill persons, another for old low skill persons and a third for (old) high skill persons. Depending on the assumptions we make of individual preferences, the tax system will in one case collapse to a two point system, while in another case three points will be used. In the third tax system the planner can observe each individuals age. The planner designs three income points; one for young low skill persons, another for old low skill persons and a third for (old) high skill persons.
There are many studies using an OLG model with a homogenous population and no intragenerational redistribution. These models have sometimes been used to study to what extent savings should be taxed. In this paper we focus on the intragenerational redistributive e¤ects of income taxation in a multiperiod framework. This complicates the model. To keep the model manageable we simplify in other respects. Our basic model is formulated in such a way that net aggregate savings are zero in each period. In the basic model we will therefore not be able to study the issue of whether savings should be taxed or not.
There are several earlier studies using an OLG model with heterogeneous skill levels (Brett, 1998 , and Pirttilä and Tuomala, 1998). These articles di¤er from our paper as they focus on the division of life into a working period and a retirement period. In our model we focus on the fact that individuals have di¤erent income paths and that inequality widens with the age of cohorts.
We consider the idea that the income tax schedule should be age speci…c. A related idea is put forward by Mirrlees (1997) , who …rst suggests that each age cohort should face a separate tax schedule. He then gives arguments that the informational requirements in practice would make such a tax system unfeasible. The tax system we suggest does not face the problems a cohort related tax would face.
The possibility of lump-sum taxation with some redistributive power have earlier been discussed by, for example, Hahn (1973) and Viard (2001) . In his concluding remarks Hahn (1972) argues that lump sum taxes are available. However, the examples he gives of lump sum taxes used in the past seems of little relevance for taxation today. Akerlof (1978) discusses how the tax-transfer system can be made more e¢cient if a "needy group" can be identi…ed, tagged, and given a tax-transfer system of its own. Viard (2001) studies an optimal linear income tax in a model where some exoge-nous characteristics can be observed (age and sex would be two examples). The population can be divided into J nonoverlapping groups according to these exogenous characteristics. The distribution of wages di¤ers between groups. Taxes can then be designed di¤erently across groups. Viard …nds that using group varying demogrants partly takes us in the direction of …rst best taxation. First best taxation achieves equality of the social value of income between all individuals. Demogrants that can vary across groups achieves equality of the mean net social value of income across groups. Using numerical calculations Viard makes a detailed comparison of the …rst best and the optimum achieved by the linear tax with group varying demogrants. Kremer (2002) investigates the conditions under which an age dependent income tax might be bene…cial. However, he considers the case where annual, and not life time, utilities enter the social welfare function. He also presents empirical data that supports the idea that an age dependent income tax would be of value. Gervais (2001) considers an OLG model with a homogenous population and proportional taxation of labor income and savings. He relates his analysis to the US economy and …nds that the US tax system to some extent indeed has age dependent taxation, but that the pattern of taxation deviates from the optimal one.
In section 2 we present our model. Section 3 deals with the simpli…ed case where there are no opportunities to save. We show how observability of age allows a Pareto improvement upon an optimal income tax system not being able to condition the tax upon age. In section four we assume access to the international capital market, so that savings are possible. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
The Model
The economy is described by an overlapping generations model where there is no population growth, each cohort consists of a large number of individuals and the size of each cohort is normalized to one. All agents are low-skilled (earning a unitary wage w l ) when "young" and each agent faces an exogenous probability ¼ lh to become high-skilled (earning a unitary wage w h ) in the second period of his life; therefore, by the assumption of a large number of households, the proportions of low-and high-skilled individuals among "old" people are given by ¼ ll = 1 ¡ ¼ lh and ¼ lh respectively.
All agents are ex ante identical and derive utility from consumption when young (c y ) and consumption when old (c o ). Moreover, they get disutility from labor supplied when young (L y ) and when old (L o ). Lifetime utility is represented by the additive separable concave utility function
, which is assumed to be identical between households and where ½ is a rate of time preference 1 . At the rate of interest r 1 Notice that preferences are constrained to be age-independent. prevailing in the credit market, agents are free to save (borrow) in the …rst period of their life in order to …nance future (present) consumption. Labor income (I = wL) is assumed to be taxed on a nonlinear scale through a general income tax function T (I) and interest incomes (rs) through a residence-based taxation at a proportional rate t (with full o¤sets for net interest paid). Production is linear and uses labor as the only factor.
The government's problem is to maximize the ex post utility of those who remain low-skilled subject to the constraint of a minimum level of utility to those who become high-skilled 2 , a set of incentive-compatibility constraints, a balanced budget constraint and the resource constraint of the economy. Notice that this implies that the objective function of the government does not coincide with what young people actually maximize 3 (i.e. ex ante expected utility). This would not have been the case if we had assumed the view that the policy maker was concerned with maximizing ex ante expected utility (as for instance done by Cremer and Gahvari (1995)) or if we had assumed that people perfectly knew in the …rst period of their life what would have been their skill level in the second period.
Looking at the consumer's behavior and denoting by B = I ¡ T (I) the after tax labor income, we have that those who turn out to be high-skilled when old will have a level of consumption in the second period of their life given by
while the one of those who turn out to remain low-skilled also when old will be
In the …rst period of life the conditional demand for savings of an expected utility maximizing agent can be written with obvious notation as The household's problem is
The …rst order conditions are the following:
Combining (1) and (2), we have that the marginal income tax rate on young people is implicitly given by
As regards the marginal income tax rates on old agents (low skilled or high skilled), since savings are given for old individuals, the marginal income tax rates are:
It will be convenient to look by now in more details at the optimal level of saving chosen by young agents. Having denoted by q the net rate of return on savings, the second order condition that must be satis…ed for an optimal level of consumption is
Implicit di¤erentiation of (1) gives the following comparative statics results which we will use in the next sections:
The …rst three inequalities follow from the assumption that c y is a normal good. As regards the sign of (9), (10), (11) and (12), we have that
0 if consumption and leisure are Edgeworth substitutes (complements) in u. Finally, notice that the sign of (12) will be unambiguously negative for a borrower, since for such an individual income and substitution e¤ects push in the same direction, while it becomes ambiguous for a lender, depending on the relative magnitudes of the substitution e¤ect (negative) and the income e¤ect (positive).
The Case without Savings
In this section we limit ourselves to the analysis of the case where the productive technology is linear, uses e¤ective labor as the only productive factor and agents have no access to the international capital market. In this case the production function can be described as:
Case 1: The Information on the Distribution of Skills across Age Groups is not used
Denoting by V indirect utilities and by a "hat" a variable when referred to a mimicker, the government's problem (P1) is the following:
where V is a pre-set utility level and Lagrange multipliers are within parentheses. Notice that at an optimum, both the µ-constraint (government's budget constraint) and the ±-constraint (resource constraint of the economy) must be binding; this means that at an optimum the following condition must hold:
Condition (13) allows the government's problem to be rewritten as if the policy maker chose directly consumption's levels (and gross labor incomes), instead of disposable incomes (and gross labor incomes), and without taking explicitly into account the resource constraint of the economy. It will therefore be
16)
Dividing (17) by (15) and using condition (5), we get the usual result of "no distortion at the top":
which in this context means that the labor/leisure choice of those who turn out to be high-skilled in the second period of their life should not be distorted at the margin.
On the other hand, dividing (16) by (14), we have that young people and those who remain low-skilled also in the second period of their life face a positive (due to the standard assumption of single crossing) marginal income tax rate given by
where the term inside brackets represents the di¤erence between the marginal valuation of leisure in terms of consumption for a low skilled agent and for a mimicker. Denoting by
the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption, we can also write condition (19) as:
Case 2: Age is not Observable but the Information on the Distribution of Skills across Age Groups is used
The use of the information on how skills are distributed across age groups, even if age is not directly observable, allows in principle the policy maker to select three di¤erent points in the (I,B)-space. In this case the government's problem (P2) would be as follows 4 :
Constraints (Á) and (') together imply that the utility that agents get in the …rst period of their life must be equal to the utility obtained in the second period of their life by those who remain low skilled. Notice that this alone is not su¢cient to conclude that the level of consumption and labor supply of a young agent is the same as the one of an old low-skilled person. Moreover, di¤erent consumption-leisure bundles that are equally preferred by a low skilled agent will be in general not indi¤erent when evaluated by a high skilled agent acting as a mimicker. However, as it is clear from …g. 1, it can be proved that an optimum is only compatible with both the constraints (¹) and (´) binding at the same time, which in turn means that not only the consumption-leisure bundles for a young household and for an old low skilled one should lie on the same indi¤erence curve of a low skilled agent, but that those bundles should also lie on the same indi¤erence curve of a high skilled agent: by single-crossing this can happen only if the two bundles are actually a unique bundle. Otherwise, a tax reform can be implemented that leaves each agent at the same utility level and that at the same time generates additional revenue to the government (see …g. 2-5 in Appendix).
This means that the policy maker is actually o¤ering only two points on the (I,B)-space and therefore we are back to case 1).
Case 3: Age is Observable and the Information on the Distribution of Skills across Age Groups is used
Before presenting the analysis of the optimal income tax system we show that observability of age admits a Pareto improvement upon the optimal tax system where age is not observable. Fig. 1 gives an example of how a Pareto-improving reform could be implemented by conditioning the income tax schedule to the age of individuals. Fig. 1 The reform can be illustrated as follows: 1) Make the choice of the bundle (I y ; B y ) more e¢cient while keeping constant utility for young agents;
2) keep constant utility for old high skilled by still giving them the same bundle ¡ I h o ; B h o ¢ which was optimally given in the two points system;
3) give revenue released to old low skilled and distort their consumption/work choice so that to keep the self-selection constraint satis…ed.
The suggested pattern of the changes is:
We next consider the optimal tax. When the policy maker can observe age and uses the information on the correlation between skill and age in order to optimally shape the income tax schedule, the government's problem (P3)
where in writing the self-selection constraints we have used the property that mimicking cannot occur between agents at di¤erent points in their lifetime.
Again, dividing (25) by (22) and using condition (3), we have that the labor/leisure choice of old high-skilled households is not distorted at the margin:
5 See footnote 3
On the other hand, what comes new in this context, as compared to the previous two cases, is that the income point intended for the young is not mimicked by anyone else and, as a consequence of this, also the labor/leisure choice of young households does not need to be distorted at the margin; dividing (23) by (20) we …nd:
Finally, by dividing (24) by (21), we have that the only agents which are faced with a non-zero marginal income tax rate are the old low-skilled households:
Comments
Using the information on the correlation of skills and age in the population is Pareto improving only if age is directly observable. If age is not directly observable, the information on the joint distribution of skills and age in the population can be Pareto improving had we assumed an age-dependent utility function (for instance assuming that old people appreciate leisure relatively more than young people).
The Model with Access to the International Capital Market
The productive technology is represented by the same function as before but, since we allow for both borrowing and lending in the international capital market, the resource constraint of the economy takes the form:
where w l and w h denote the constant marginal productivity of respectively low skilled labor (unitary wage rate for low skilled workers) and high skilled labor (unitary wage rate for high skilled workers), while r denotes the marginal productivity of capital 6 K (gross rate of return on savings) 7 .
Combining the households' budget constraints 
we get the government's budget constraint:
This implies that in the government's problem we need to take into account only one from the resource constraint and government budget constraint.
Case 1: The "Two Points" System
When the government is constrained in the design of the …scal policy by the fact that it must o¤er the same bundle in the (I; B)-space for both the young and the old low skilled agents, its problem (P4) is the following:
Having de…ned the variable q as q = r (1 ¡ t), the f.o.c. are the following 8 :
(1 +¸) @u y @c y
Having de…ned with ª the Lagrangian of the government's problem P4 and denoting by ¦ the derivative of ª with respect to c y , we can now state the following proposition: 8 Notice that in the f.o.c. for the "two points system", since the government is constrained to choose By = B (6) and (7), and (9) and (10).
Proposition 1 Pareto e¢cient taxation in the two income points system implies that the marginal (labor) income tax rate 9 faced by old high skilled agents is given by:
To understand what lies behind eq. (31) notice that the marginal income tax rate faced by old high skilled agents should be di¤erent from zero only if the policy maker, by distorting their consumption/leisure choice, can a¤ect savings (which are not a control variable in the government's problem) in a socially valuable way. In other words, eq. (31) says that in deciding about the sign of the marginal income tax rate we have to evaluate the direction of the welfare e¤ects of the changes in savings that follow an increase in labor supply I h o of old high skilled agents. Not only; we also have also to take into account how savings are a¤ected by the increase in the post-tax earning B h o of high skilled agents (given by their marginal disutility of e¤ort in terms of consumption) needed to induce them to marginally increase their labor supply.
Notice that eq. (31) implies that old high skilled agents, even if they cannot be mimicked and the bundle intended for them is not L-linked to any other bundle, have nonetheless their consumption/leisure choice distorted in some way.
In eq. (31), the sign of the quantity inside brackets is unambiguously negative if consumption and leisure are Edgeworth complements in the function u, whereas it cannot be determined a priori if consumption and leisure are Edgeworth substitutes in u.
In the two points system young agents and old low skilled ones are bunched together at the same income point. At this common point the labor income tax schedule is kinked, but it is possible to show that there always exists an implementing tax structure whose left (right)-hand derivative at I l is equal to 1 ¡ MRS I;B for those with the steepest ( ‡attest) indi¤er-ence curves among those who are bunched together. Since in our model the young individuals expect on average to become more skilled in the second period of their life, the old (young) low skilled agents are those with the steepest ( ‡attest) indi¤erence curves among the ones pooled together.
We can therefore state the following result:
Proposition 2 The optimal allocation in the two income points system can be implemented through a labor income tax structure whose left-hand-and right-hand derivative at the common point in the (I; B)-space for young workers and old low skilled workers are respectively given by:
Proof. See Appendix.
As regards the sign of term A in (32), it is in general ambiguous and it can be determined a priori only in the case when consumption and leisure are Edgeworth complements in the function u: in that case we would have that if savings of young agents are positive (negative), then A takes a negative (positive) value.
The Optimal Interest Income Tax Rate
Having denoted with e c y the compensated consumption demand of young agents, the optimal interest income tax is characterized by the following: Proposition 3 Pareto e¢cient interest income taxation in the two income points system requires that the following condition holds:
Proof. See the Appendix.
What will turn out to be relevant for our purposes is that the numerator of the term on the right hand side of (34) is in general not equal to zero, which means that also the marginal income tax rate (and therefore the marginal e¤ective tax rate) faced by old high skilled agents (see eq. (31)) will be in general di¤erent from zero.
Case 2: The "Three Points" System
When the government is free to make the nonlinear income tax schedule dependent on the observable characteristic "age" and the information on the distribution of skills across age groups is used, its problem (P5) becomes the following:
In the three points system the …rst order conditions referred to the pretax labor income and after-tax labor income for old high skilled and to the interest income tax formally do not change when compared to those derived for the two points system, whereas the …rst order conditions of the government's problem with respect to the pre-tax labor income and after-tax labor income for young agents are respectively given by:
and those for old low skilled agents are instead:
Having de…ned with ¤ the Lagrangian of the government's problem P5, we can now state the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Pareto e¢cient taxation, when age is observable and the government uses the information on the distribution of skills across age groups, implies that: a) the young agents face a marginal (labor) income tax rate of zero; b) the old high skilled agents face both a marginal (labor) income tax rate and a marginal e¤ective tax rate of zero.
As regards the old low skilled, the relevant result is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Pareto e¢cient taxation, when age is observable and the government uses the information on the distribution of skills across age groups, implies that old low skilled agents face a positive marginal labor income tax rate and a positive marginal e¤ective tax rate. Proof. See Appendix.
The Optimal Interest Income Tax Rate
The optimal interest income tax is characterized by the following: Proposition 6 Pareto e¢cient interest income taxation, when age is observable and the government uses the information on the distribution of skills across age groups, requires that ¦ goes to zero which in turn implies that:
Proof. See Appendix. The "no distortion results" stated in Proposition 4 suggest that if the government can condition taxes on age, as it happens in the three income points system, there is no gain in distorting the labor/leisure choice of agents that nobody tries to mimic. This happens because the instrument of interest income taxation serves fully the purpose of achieving the socially desirable level of savings when the government is not prevented from selecting di¤erent points in the (I,B)-space for young and old low skilled agents.
Summary
To be written. Suppose that C is the bundle for young agents, A the one for old high skilled and D that for old low skilled: this solution is not implementable since the old high skilled would like to mimic the old low skilled and the self-selection constraint is violated. Fig. 3 Suppose that C is the bundle for young agents, A the one for old high skilled and D that for old low skilled: this solution is not optimal since moving the old low skilled from point D to point C increases the revenue collected by the government without violating any self-selection constraints. Suppose that C is the bundle for young agents, A the one for old high skilled and D that for old low skilled: this solution is not optimal since moving the young from point C to point D increases the revenue collected by the government and slackens the binding self-selection constraint preventing old high skilled to mimic young agents. Suppose that C is the bundle for young agents, A the one for old high skilled and D that for old low skilled: this solution is not implementable since the old high skilled would like to mimic the old low skilled and the self-selection constraint is violated as it happened in …g. 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
De…ne the quantity ¦ as 
Dividing (41) by (42) and multiplying by
Rearranging terms we get
Eq. (31) is obtained from eq. (44) using the de…nition of marginal income tax rate given by (5).
Proof of Proposition 2
Using the quantity ¦ previously de…ned, f.o.c. (26) and (27) can be respectively rewritten as
Dividing (46) by (45) and multiplying by
To get eq. (32) write eq. (47) as
and remember that, since in our model the old low skilled agents have indi¤erence curves in the (I,B) which are steeper than the ones for young agents, there exists an implementing tax structure at the bunching point I l whose left-hand derivative is equal to 1 +
To obtain eq. (33) write eq. (47) as
and remember that, since in our model the young agents have indi¤erence curves in the (I,B) which are ‡atter than the ones for old low skilled agents, there exists an implementing tax structure at the bunching point I l whose right-hand derivative is equal to 1 + @uy @I l @u y @c y .
Proof of Proposition 3
To be written.
Proof of Proposition 4
Making use of the quantity ¦ de…ned in (40) 10 , f.o.c. (35) and (36) become respectively:
Dividing (49) by (50) and multiplying by
Collecting terms containing µ we have:
1 0 Notice however that now ¡¦ is to be interpreted as the derivative of the Lagrangian (¤) of P5 with respect to savings. 
From the de…nition given by (3) of marginal (labor) income tax rate faced by young agents, we obtain:
Since the f.o.c. with respect to I h o and B h o formally do not change switching from the two income points system to the three income points system, we have that the formal expression for the marginal (labor) income tax rate faced by old high skilled agents is still given by eq. (31); therefore it is:
Now de…ne the quantity ¡ as 
Summing up (55) and (56) 
which holds if ¦ = 0, given that @ e c y @q < 0. Substituting ¦ = 0 in (52) and (53) we get the results stated in Proposition 4. The result referred to the marginal e¤ective tax rate faced by old high skilled agents descends from footnote 9.
Proof of Proposition 5
Using the quantity ¦, f.o.c. 
Since we at the optimum ¦ must be equal to zero, eq. (63) reduces to: 
The term B in eq. (64) looks familiar from the standard analyses in the optimal taxation tradition and is positive because of the agent monotonicity assumption which implies that at any point in the labor-consumption space the indi¤erence curve of an old high skilled worker is ‡atter than the one of an old low skilled. Finally, the result referred to the marginal labor income tax rate follows using the de…nition of (implicit) marginal income tax rate given by (4) whereas the one referred to the marginal e¤ective tax rate is again a consequence of what observed in footnote 9.
Proof of Proposition 6
We have already showed in subsection 6.5 that in the three income points system the solution to the government's problem involves ¦ = 0.
An explicit solution for the e¢cient ad valorem tax rate on interest income can be found by solving (40) for the value of t which makes ¦ go to zero. Straightforward manipulations gets the value given by eq. (39).
